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Abstract
Defining access control policies for Java applications can be complex. This project investigates
methods to simplify the process. First, static analysis was used to help determine permission
requirements. The results of this analysis led towards the development of a new view of Java
access control, called the Action-Centric Model. The Action-Centric Model provides a higher-level
view of Java access control in order to simplify the process of creating policy and facilitate analysis
of existing policies.
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As our daily lives become more dependent upon computer applications, the risks associated with
computer systems becoming compromised or acting improperly build. Every day hundreds of
millions of people trust computer applications to process their personal data, execute potentially
life changing transactions, provide important communication channels, and organize their lives.
All this must be accomplished with high reliability and without violating the users’ privacy.
Access control is one method to help achieve these requirements. Access control provides ways
to place limits on the privileges of an application, typically at runtime, using a set of authorizations.
Limiting applications’ access to sensitive data or computing resources effectively limits the risk of
compromised applications and unexpected access to resources. For example, most applications do
not access to personal files such as customer billing information, but a compromised system may
attempt to acquire such data. Access control can eliminate this threat by denying access to any
data outside the scope of what the application requires. Access control can also be utilized to
help reduce downtime by eliminating the possibility for applications to damage or overuse critical
resources. For example, important system files could be protected by access control to avoid
unexpected access, or important socket port ranges could be protected and reserved for specific
applications.
1.1 Introduction to Access Control in Java
This section focuses on the design and usage of Java’s ability to provide fine-grained access con-
trol to features such as file access, socket communication, program configuration, and security
configuration.[7] A discussion of challenges in using Java security follows the practical introduc-
tion. There are many security features dealing with Java’s class loaders that help assure that
the code is from a trusted source as well as features for certificate and key management that will
not be discussed here. These features are important to Java’s overall security design, but are not
important to this project.
1.1.1 How Java Performs Security Checks
Overview
When a Java application is launched, it receives a security policy. Usually, the policy is read in
from a file when the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) starts or provided by the application server
hosting the application. When a Java class is loaded, it is assigned to a protection domain based
1
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on its class-path and code source (which JAR it came from). Protection domains are groups of
classes which share a set of permissions. A permission defines a specific privledge that should
be granted to a protection domain. The security policy defines what permissions each protection
domain has been granted. The Java Security Manager is responsible for determining if a specific
permission is granted to a piece of code by examining the minimal permission set of all protection
domains in the call stack. The call stack is a list that tracks the path of method invocations to
the current point of execution. The minimal permission set is computed by traversing the call
stack to determine all the protection domains that are crossed, then taking the intersection of the
permission sets of all these protection domains. The minimal set must be computed, otherwise
unprivileged code could be allowed to perform privileged actions by simply calling through another
protection domain. During a security check, if the required permission is granted, the program
continues normal execution. If the permission is not granted, a SecurityException is thrown, which
can be handled or cause the application to terminate.[7]
Detail
Before performing a security check, a permission object that represents the desired authorization
must be constructed. This is done by creating an instance of Java’s Permission class. The Per-
mission class is an abstract class used to define a type of authorization. The implies(Permission)
method of the Permission class is used to determine if a given permission is granted by another.
The implies(Permission) method can be used to infer other permissions that should logically be
granted. For instance, a permission that grants read access to the file space named “/usr/*”
would imply a permission with access to “/usr/local/*”. Commonly used extensions of Permission
include:
• java.io.FilePermission - Represents a file read and/or write authorization
• java.net.SocketPermission - Represents authorization to connect, accept, and/or work
with sockets
• java.lang.RuntimePermision - Represents authorization to do any one of several Java
Virtual Machine related actions
• java.lang.ReflectPermission - Represents authorization to do any one of several Java
Object Reflection related actions
• java.security.AllPermission - Causes all permissions to be granted, regardless of what
abilities they grant
There are many other extensions of Permission included in Java that are not mentioned here. It
is not uncommon for an application to have its own domain-specific extensions of Permission. All
standard permissions are parameterized by two Strings. The first is called the target. It generally
contains information about what specific objects the permission is talking about. The second is
called the action. It contains information about what sorts of operations the permission is allowing
on the target.
Once the proper Permission is constructed, it is passed to the Security Manager where it
is checked against the current policy. This process is demonstrated in Figure 1.1. The Secu-
rity Manager is usually accessed through the System.getSecurityManager() method. To invoke a
security check, either the SecurityManager.checkPermission(Permission) method or the SecurityMan-
ager.checkPermission(Permission, AccessControlContext) method is called. The AccessControlCon-
text encapsulates the context under which the security check should be carried out. Most notably,
the AccessControlContext is responsible for determining the minimal permission set in the case
that the call stack crosses more than one Protection Domain. If an AccessControlContext is not
provided to checkPermission(), the Security Manager delegates to the Access Controller, where
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the appropriate AccessControlContext is created. Once the AccessControlContext is determined,
the Permission is passed to that AccessControlContext’s checkPermission method. The AccessCon-
trolContext then checks to be sure each Protection Domain has been granted the Permission in
question or one that implies it. The ProtectionDomain objects each call out to the system’s current
Policy object to make the individual checks. If any Protection Domain has not been granted the
desired permission, an AccessControlException is thrown, causing a SecurityException to be thrown
from the SecurityManager. If the security check passes, the program continues to run normally.
doPrivileged There is a special construct defined in Java called a PrivilegedAction. The Ac-
cessController.doPrivileged() method takes in a PrivilegedAction and executes its run() method with
special security semantics. In particular, the ProtectionDomains in the call stack above the call to
doPrivileged() are not inspected to see if they have the required Permissions. This allows a certain
block of code to “take responsibility” for its actions, and encapsulate some particular secure com-
putation. It could be used in library code or specific application code to provide a service needed
by other applications that should not be granted certain permissions.
Figure 1.1: Control flow of a typical security check
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The Need to Determine Permission Requirements Accurately
The access control requirements of an application are represented by a policy containing a set
of permissions. In order to ensure that a given application operates as expected, the proper
set of permissions must be identified. An application becomes a security hole if it is provided
with permissions that grant access to resources that the application would not normally use. If
this application were to be compromised, these additional resources would be placed in jeopardy
needlessly. If the over-privileged application contains coding errors, these additional resources
could be overused or damaged accidentally. An application becomes unusable if it is not provided
with permissions that grant access to the resources it needs to operate. When this application is
run, it will not function properly and possibly terminate unexpectedly. The desired policy strikes
a balance between these two situations by granting the application exactly the permissions it needs
to operate and no others.
1.2 The Challenges in Working With Permissions
Many developers find it hard to define security policies for several reasons.
Determining the permission requirements is not always straightforward. Some method
calls and JVM actions result in unexpected permission requirements. Without a very deep under-
standing of how the JVM acts and a complete knowledge of Java’s security systems, it is likely
that application developers and maintainers will not understand where all permission requirements
actually come from nor will they understand exactly what they mean. Without this knowledge,
these key people may not understand the security risks and implications associated with certain
sets of permissions.
There is no fail safe way of detecting permission requirements before run time. The
exact behavior of any program is affected by runtime data which may not be available before the
program runs. Because of the undecidable nature of the problem, it is not possible to predict
the parameters of all permissions. Without complete knowledge of all parameters, it is likely
that the program will either not be granted enough permissions, causing it to fail security checks
unexpectedly, or will be granted too many permissions, opening security holes.
The language of permissions is verbose. Permission classes must be specified by fully qual-
ified names (FQNs) which are long and tedious for application developers and maintainers to type
out. The policy file syntax is also verbose, requiring significant amounts of repeated data entry,
putting additional strain on the developer and increasing the chance of error. Permission parame-
ter syntax is also complex in many cases, making it prone to human error. Multiple pieces of data
are often grouped into one string parameter, making permission parameters hard to understand
and prone to syntactic errors, which are hard to troubleshoot.
Sets of permissions often appear together. We expect that certain tasks will require more
than one permission to be granted. For many common tasks, it is possible to specify exactly what
permissions would be required in a standardized way. Java policy creation currently does not take
advantage of this. Instead, each permission must be individually defined, even if it is part of a
larger logical set.
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1.3 Related Work and Motivation
1.3.1 Static Analysis and Permissions
Static analysis is one method that has met with some significant success in security analysis for
Java [4] [5] [10] [11]. Some studies that include static analysis have focused on locating behavior
of Java programs that might be conducted in an insecure manner[11]. Others have focused on
features of the Java language in particular, specifically the way Java handles security checks through
Permissions and stack inspection [4] [10] [5]. The SWORD4J application is of particular intrest to
this project because it uses static analysis to infer the permission requirements of Java programs
[2]. The description of the algorithm written by Koved and used in SWORD4J was the starting
point for our investigation into static analysis[10].
One result that has been investigated through the use of static analysis is the inference of
Permissions that are checked within a program [10], [9]. The goal of such a procedure is to produce
the most accurate possible representation of the set of Permissions required by a program. This
information can be used to create policy files at the level of Permissions and begin to understand
the security requirements of the program. We consider how this information can be used and how
other models can provide a better understanding of security.
Permissions as a Low-Level View of Security
Inferring what permissions are required by detecting permission checks in method calls can result
in a specification of a set of Permissions required by a program. It should be clear that permission
objects themselves are simply instances of a particular Java class. They have meaning relative to
the Java security system, including SecurityManagers and AccessControllers. This understanding is
important when one considers a set of “required” Permissions. Saying Permissions are required is
to say: “If a runtime policy is created for this ProtectionDomain that does not contain at least this
set of Permissions with these arguments, then a SecurityException will be thrown.” This result can
be quite useful, in terms of getting existing code to run under a SecurityManager. Depending on
the understanding available about what each of these Permissions means, this could say very much
or very little about the actual capabilities the program is being granted.
The identification of Permissions is an important first step in understanding the security require-
ments and behavior of Java programs. It provides a view of security at the level it is implemented.
However, the way Permissions are implemented in the Java security framework is really just pro-
gram behavior. A application developer or maintainer uses his or her own knowledge of Java access
control to add the proper Permissions to their policies. Information about the Permission require-
ments of a program can provide a starting point for a more high level analysis which describes
the security and resource requirements of a program without the need to use specific language
constructs.
Specificity of Results
In general, perfectly describing the Permission requirements of a program is not possible. Runtime
data is not available statically, and resolving all the Permissions themselves is in general undecid-
able. Runtime analysis can help to specify some cases of runtime data, but the general problem
still remains. The simple fact is that all the information about Permissions will not be available.
It is possible to get very close in many cases (and as we will show, other projects have succeeded
at this to much greater degrees than this one [10] [9]). In general, however, the goal of iden-
tifying Permissions should be to get as much information as is feasible, and use it as a starting
point for a further analysis. This further analysis can have the goal of providing a more complete
understanding of the security requirements of the program.
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1.3.2 A Simpler Model
The Action-Centric Model we will present in this report represents a particular high-level view of
security. The goal of the abstraction from Java’s security implementation is to allow for flexibility,
extensibility, and understandability. Here we consider some of the benefits and applications of
such a model.
Simplifying Policy Creation
Just defining the Permissions that go into a policy file is not necessarily an easy task. The pa-
rameters of each desired Permission must be specified, and the Permissions that “should” go into
the policy file must already be known. Sun Microsystems created a program called “Policy Tool”,
which can be used to create individual policy specifications at the level of Permissions [1]. It has a
graphical user interface (GUI) to reduce some of the complexity of dealing with permission syntax.
The tool allows the user to specify what permissions should be granted. This can be used to
specify commonly-found Permissions on a case-by-case basis. Another approach to defining how
security should be controlled is suggested by the Security Annotation Framework (SAF), which
uses Java annotations to enforce access control decisions [3]. This allows for further control over
security in Java than what provided by Permissions. As far as defining policy in terms of Java Per-
missions, however, a tool that could simplify the specification of permissions would be desirable.
We present an implementation of a high level model of security in the form of a NetBeans plug-in
that demonstrates how such a model could help do this.
High-Level View of Security
This project attempted to present application developers and maintainers with a view of Java access
control that focuses on larger tasks rather than fine grained authorizations. The Action-Centric
Model removes much of the complexity associated with Java access control. Actions represent tasks
which can imply many permissions, thus reducing the amount of items that need to be inputted
into the policy. The action view also helps conceptualize the actual resource usage of an application
by focusing attention on the resources being acted upon rather than the permissions required for
execution. The parameters used to build actions are much simpler than Java permission parameters
because they avoid confusing syntax and do not combine multiple pieces of input data into single
strings. By translating actions into rules, then back to actions, the Action-Centric Model can
detect implied actions. These implied actions can help find security holes that otherwise might go
unnoticed. By combining all this functionality, the Action-Centric Model provides a view of Java
access control that is more convenient and easier to understand than Java permissions alone.
1.4 Contributions
There are several ways in which this project contributes to solving some of the overall challenges
present in using Java security. One particular theme is the usefulness of detailed permission
information in the context of the problem - that is, making the task of developing an application
to run under a security manager simpler. It is important to have information about permission
requirements in order to create an effective policy. However, the task of creating policies permission
by permission can be confusing and has a steep learning curve. This project began with an attempt
to build a tool that would infer security checks using static analysis. The results of this analysis
proved to be ineffective in accomplishing the main goal of simplifying the view of security. Both
the inaccuracy of the analysis and the overwhelming amount of data that the analysis does present
suggested that modeling security in terms of some abstraction of permission requirements would
be desirable. A summary of our specific contributions:
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1. An implementation of existing static analysis strategies for inferring permissions was built.
This lead to mixed results, which are presented in 2.2. The results suggest that work in the
direction of high-level modeling may benefit from existing work on static analysis.
2. An extensible, action-based model of access control was defined, which is used to provide
some useful abstractions and models of Java Permissions. This model is detailed in 3.1.
3. The model provides for future modifications, customizations to particular security environ-
ments, and the possibility of portability to other security implementations. The extensibility
of the model is discussed in 3.2.1.
4. Methods for interpreting information about existing policies or Permissions in existing code
are discussed, which include the use of static analysis, and the use of its results in the model.
5. Possible further work is proposed in 4.3 for providing alternative methods of creating and
using Java security policy, both at development time and runtime.
Chapter 2
Static Analysis
Attempting to statically infer permission checks is one way to help understand the security require-
ments of Java programs. Presenting an estimation of an application’s permission requirements
would give someone with knowledge of the security system the most accurate picture of what the
requirements of the code actually are. This information could be used for review by the policy
developer to create or inform the creation of policy files and to provide a starting point for future
analysis. So, the goal of static analysis is to get as complete a picture as possible of the actual
permission requirements of a Java program in terms of permission checks.
There was existing interest at Sun Microsystems in using static analysis to infer permission
requirements of Java programs. Several small prototypes were available, but no complete solution.
To better understand common situations that arise in Java’s security context, and provide detailed
information about Permissions, an implementation of static analysis for permission inference was
attempted. This attempt, while not entirely successful, showed what kind of results can be expected
from this kind of analysis, and what some of the challenges are in performing it.
In general, the detection of all permission requirements of a Java application is undecidable
by Rice’s Theorem[14], so any static analysis algorithm must decide whether to overestimate or
underestimate. In our case, we will show that our analysis is conservative in that it reports a set




The algorithm used to perform the static analysis is a combination of call graph traversal and
data flow analysis. It is based on an algorithm created by Larry Koved[10] to perform a similar
analysis on Java 1.2 security. The level of correctness and termination of the algorithm are proved
by Koved as well. This section briefly summarizes this algorithm to inform the description of the
implementation that follows. The basic structure of the algorithm is as follows:
1. Create a complete, context-insensitive method invocation graph with edges E and nodes N .
2. Associate with each node ν a set of required permissions denoted by P (ν), initially empty.
3. For each node ν ∈ N that is a call to checkPermission() with permission pi, let P (ν) =
P (ν) ∪ {pi}.
8
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4. For each node ν¯ which has an edge directed at ν (i.e. represents a method that calls ν), if
P (ν) 6⊆ P (ν¯), then let P (ν¯) = P (ν¯) ∪ P (ν), and repeat step 2 for all nodes with an edge
directed into ν¯. Otherwise, stop.
Assuming that the permissions are checked at each call to checkPermission() are known (which
is not an entirely safe assumption), this process leads to an overestimating approximation of the
permissions possibly required for each method in the program. In the case of the call graph, most
of the “extra” permissions come from inability to resolve virtual calls. Further approximation is
made in actually determining the characteristics of these permissions (see 2.1.1).
Special Cases
There are several special cases that this algorithm needs to handle, based on particular constructs
in the Java programming language and Java security specification. These mostly involve handling
exceptional cases in the control flow or definitions of granted permissions in certain contexts.
Handling Threads When the start() method of a Thread object is called in the JRE, several
things happen. The JVM executes some native code to create a new thread in the operating system,
associates it with the Java Thread object, associates with this object the access control context
that created the Thread object, and calls the run() method of the Thread in this context. This
means that when a node in the call graph is encountered that represents a call to Thread.run(),
the permissions required here do not necessarily reflect the permissions required in the context
that called Thread.start(). Rather, they are required in the context that called Thread.<init>().
This means that if a node ν is a node representing the method Thread.run(), then in addition to
traversing nodes ν¯ that call ν directly, the traversal should also go each node νˆ which represents
a constructor Thread.<init>() for this Thread object.
Handling doPrivileged() Invoking a method using doPrivileged() has special meaning for the
security context below that call in the call stack. It indicates that only the security context of the
caller should be taken into account in code executed within the doPrivileged() call. In terms of this
algorithm, a doPrivileged() block is a stopping point for the graph traversal, since no context above
the call requires having the permissions below the call. That is, when a node ν is encountered which
represents doPrivileged(), the traversal should stop and not propagate the required permissions to
any further nodes.
Handling SecurityExceptions In some programs, a SecurityException being thrown is expected
behavior. One can imagine a situation where an application handles the exception that is thrown
when a login fails, for instance, and the call to checkPermission() failing does not necessarily
indicate an application failure. In terms of this algorithm, this means that a method which catches
a SecurityException and handles it without re-throwing the exception is treated in the same way as
a call to doPrivileged(). That is, the calls in the stack above the call to the method which catches
the exception should not be marked as requiring all the permissions of that method.
Basic Data Flow Analysis
In the initialization of the above algorithm, the call graph analysis described above assumes that
at each program point that calls checkPermission(), the Permission argument to the call is known.
However, it is not always trivial to find the specifics of the Permission that is being checked. A
simple data flow analysis algorithm was used to describe these Permission arguments in some
simple cases.
Once the program point that calls SecurityManager.checkPermission() is found, it is simple
to extract the expression that is passed as the Permission argument to the method. From this
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program point, the list of statements in the body of the method is traversed against the direction
of program flow to find an instance of the constructor call to the relevant Permission type, or
assignment statements to the variable passed to checkPermission(). This analysis only considers
the method that called checkPermission(), which is a simplifying assumption. If the constructor
is found, then the expressions passed to the constructor can be extracted, and a similar traversal
can be performed on these expressions to find their initialization. The difference in this case is
that these expressions (almost always String objects), are often declared as static fields, so the
static initializers of the relevant methods are also inspected to find definitions of static fields. This
analysis is sufficient for many simple cases, but misses many others, most commonly when the
expressions passed to the Permission constructor come into the method as parameters and their
runtime values are more difficult (or impossible) to determine.
Much of the simplicity of this traversal is due to the intermediate format Jimple from Soot,
which simplifies compound expressions in Java statements [6]. Soot will be discussed in more detail
in the next section.
2.1.2 Implementation
A number of different strategies were considered for implementing the call graph and data flow
analysis algorithms. Of primary importance was the ability to construct a Java method invocation
graph, tools for traversing it, and the possibility of using the model to perform data flow analysis.
In the end, Soot, a “Java Optimization Framework,”[13] was chosen. It has the benefits of being
well established in other large applications and research projects, being well documented, and
providing built-in call graph generation and methods for acting on generated graphs. This project
only used a small subset of the features of Soot, which has many other applications.
Soot
Soot takes Java source code, byte-code, or class-files as input and converts it into different repre-
sentations or models of the code. These representations simplify the process of performing many
tasks, including several types of static analyses. Of particular interest to this project was Soot’s
ability to make call graphs and operate on them [6].
There are four different models that Soot uses for representing Java Code, each with different
uses. The one that was used in the analyses in this project is called Jimple, which is Soot’s default
intermediate code model. It breaks complicated or compound statements down into more basic
ones (for example, i = x + y + z could become i0 = x + y; i = i0 + z), to simplify statement by
statement analysis. So, when using Jimple, Soot creates a number of intermediate variables, each
of which represents a single argument to a method invocation, class field, or local variable (that
is, the variable is never used more than once). This feature was especially relevant in simplifying
data flow analysis [6].
Call Graph Generation Soot’s call graph generation was used to create the method invocation
graphs that were the core data structure in the static analysis algorithm. For the purposes of this
project, a graph was needed that was:
1. Context-insensitive - When performing the call graph traversal, the specific call sequences
that could lead to a method invocation were not important. Instead, the set of all methods
that could invoke a given method was needed for each method, since all of the invoking
methods could need the permissions checked in any method which they transitively invoked.
2. Aware of native code functionality - When doPrivileged() or Thread.start() are called, the
JVM uses a native method to execute the run method of the PrivilegedAction or Thread in a
special context or system thread, as the case may be. The call graph creation in Soot allows
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for the insertion of implicit edges to PrivilegedAction.run() and Thread.run() from the native
calls.
With Soot’s call graph generation, a set of Java class-files or source-files are provided, along
with the name of the main class and a set of entry points to the code to be analyzed. Starting
from these method entry points, Soot is capable of generating call graphs in a number of different
ways, including allowing for these two important features.
Type Analysis When creating a method invocation graph in a language with inheritance like
Java, resolving virtual method calls statically can be a challenge. Being unable to resolve the
runtime type of objects before the creation of a call graph can seriously limit accuracy. For
example, if there is a given method that takes an argument of type Object, and then some method
say toString() is invoked on that object, a totally naive algorithm would have to assume that that
the toString() method of any class currently loaded could be called, since every class inherits from
Object. Now, in simpler cases (like the basic Object methods), this can be avoided. But with
complicated interactions between interfaces and numerous implementing classes, it is difficult (and
in general undecidable) to determine which implementation of a method will be called statically.
To remediate this problem somewhat, more of Soot’s built in features were used, which in-
cluded the ability to do on-the-fly call graph generation. This technique performs the call graph
construction along with a points-to analysis, using the information from the points-to analysis to
provide a more accurate representation of possible calls. A points-to analysis is a type of data flow
analysis, the goal of which is to determine the possible values of references at each program point
(i.e. the possible values each reference “points to”). Using this method, the size of the call graph
created by Soot was roughly cut in half.
Data Flow Analysis The algorithm used for data flow analysis described above was imple-
mented in a straightforward manner, using the Jimple representation of Java code. A given Jimple
statement in the Soot-generated code has references to the statements that come immediately
before and after it. So, once the field is found that refers to the Permission argument to a checkPer-
mission() call, this can be isolated as a Jimple identifier. From the method invocation statement,
Jimple statements are traversed backward, searching for assignments statements that include the
isolated identifier. If the Permission object was instantiated in the current method, eventually a
method invocation to Permission.<init>() will be found (or the constructor of some specific sub-
class of Permission). The arguments to this constructor can then be found as Jimple identifiers,
and a similar process can take place with them (i.e. finding where they are initialized as string
constants).
As mentioned above, it is common practice to declare specific Permissions or relevant String
constants as final static fields of the class in question. So, the data flow analysis also searches the
<clinit>() method for initializations of the fields that are found in permission checks or Permission
constructors.
This simple process is able to totally describe the checked permissions in many commonly
found cases. Extending the analysis further would allow more cases to be found, but ultimately
cannot succeed in all cases. If the Permission object or its arguments are passed into a method,
for example, interprocedural data flow analysis could provide more results, but may only find that
the information simply cannot be known until a user provides it at runtime.
Analysis Class Structure
The results of the static analysis were intended to fit into a larger framework that could be used
to take information about permission requirements from different sources and aggregate them
into one combined model. The structure would keep track of which permissions were required
at which program points, designated in the model as CodeBlocks. A CodeBlock represents an
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arbitrary segment of code of any size that has some PermissionRequirements associated with it.
These requirements would have associated with them a description of the permission and the source
that decided the requirement existed (this could be from the static analysis itself, or developer
specified). This would make it possible to compare requirements from different analyses, like static
analyses with different kinds of call graphs, or a runtime analysis. Figure 2.1 shows the structure
of these classes.
Figure 2.1: The static analysis data structure
This structure also includes ways for outside sources, like a policy file or user input, to enu-
merate expected or required permissions (not shown in Figure 2.1). These outside sources could
be compared with the model resulting from static analysis. The model could show if the expected
results were found, or add other requirements than those found by a given analysis.
2.1.3 Limitations of Static Analysis Data
To be precise, the static analysis described here provides information about which Permissions a
certain set of code needs to be granted to not throw a SecurityException at runtime. If the analysis
were perfect (which it cannot be, this type of analysis is undecidable), it could specify a precise
policy file entry for each required Permission. This would accomplish the goal of a developer being
able to run the static analysis and generate a policy file that allows the program to run under the
default SecurityManager, following the principle of least privilege for the required permissions.
In practice, this information is incomplete because of the lack of runtime data, and is overly
conservative due to the virtual call problem. However, even if perfect information was available,
this type of analysis can only tell a programmer or developer which low-level Permission objects are
required to run the code successfully. This information can be quite useful in informing decisions
about policy, but says little about what the Permissions actually mean for what the program was
designed to be allowed to do at a high-level. For example, allowing permissions to create reflected
objects is quite powerful, as it allows sidestepping visibility modifiers like protected and private.
Simply saying that a piece of code that does reflection will throw an exception if a given permission
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is not granted does not necessarily mean that the code should have these capabilities - that is up
to the developer and the application deployer. The results of the static analysis do not give an
indication as to what the expected capabilities of the program are or should be, just what the
security implementation is requiring of the program. A higher level model of security that did
not speak simply in terms of the implementation in terms of Java Permissions could be valuable in
helping to interpret the data resulting from such an analysis, or specifying the analysis from the
top down in the first place.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Successes
This section discusses the results of the static analysis procedure.
1. The analysis successfully performs a conservative analysis. That is, the actual permission
requirements of the program are a (relatively small) subset of the results provided by the
algorithm.
2. The data flow analysis captures specific permission information in several commonly found
cases.
The static analysis procedure was tested on several small sample problems, most of which were
designed to include the special cases of Thread objects and doPrivileged() blocks. The semantics
of these cases were successfully handled, and the propagation of permission requirements between
methods worked as expected. A simple test case of the static analysis procedure can be seen in
Appendix A.
Summary of Permission Requirements
While the static analysis is conservative, it still provides useful results. Information about how one
permission check in a given method propagates through the program is available. This is useful in
the case of several interacting classes with methods that provide security-checked functionality. It
is possible to see at the class and method level what permissions are required as a result of all calls
that are made from that point. Since the analysis is conservative and overestimates (drastically)
the number of permissions, it will report all the permissions that it finds, most specifically user-
defined permissions that are inside the space of the application (as opposed to permissions that
are checked in calls into JVM library methods). While the analysis will not be able to report
an exact set of the required permissions, it can give hints as to where secure behavior may not
be encapsulated and spreads the requirements to other areas of the program (other classes and
protection domains). This can provide the start of a higher level analysis of the behavior of the
application in terms of its permission requirements.
Permission Information
Due to the fact that the information specifying permissions can be found relatively “close” to
permission checks, the analysis is often able to provide the specifics of a given required permission
in terms of its arguments. This is mostly true in the case of code in libraries that does these static
or “nearby” declarations as a common practice. The importance of finding this information is
especially true in the case of permissions where the type of the permission is not as informative
as the arguments to the permission. For example, RuntimePermissions represent a wide array of
capabilities for a program, from creating reflected objects to getting system properties. The actual
capability that is described is almost entirely dependent on the argument to the permission. The
ability of the analysis to find this information can be quite valuable.
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2.2.2 Limitations
There are a number of ways in which the static analysis is limited. The conservativeness of the
algorithm has been mentioned, because of the overly verbose call graph. Other limiting factors are
discussed here as well.
Call Graph Verbosity
The main challenge facing the algorithm is creating a call graph that is complete while not being
overly verbose. The problem is mainly due to the difficulty in resolving virtual calls and performing
static type identification. Even using the optimizations that Soot provides, the call graph still has
many edges that are added amongst calls to JVM methods which take Object type parameters, and
this is because the analyis cannot resolve the type of parameter and assumes all possible subclass
calls are possible. There is a lot of existing research on creating more accurate call graphs in
object-oriented languages (and handling the virtual call problem) [15], [8]. Unfortunately, further
investigation of these methods was outside the scope of this project.
One solution that was considered in this project was to annotate library code with the permis-
sions that are required at each entry point, so the analysis could start from these points instead
of calls to checkPermission() inside the library itself. The idea of using annotations to perform
security checks has been investigated[3], but this tends to work to enforce security, rather than
describe or report existing information.
Weak Data Flow Analysis
The data flow analysis performed for this project is often able to find specific information about
permissions, but there do still exist many cases where this is not possible. The approach that is
used relies on the practice of defining permissions in certain places and ways (that is, statically
or in the same method as the permission check), which are not required. For programs written in
certain ways, the algorithm may be totally unable to detect information about the permissions.
Runtime Data
The most unavoidable limitation of the static analysis is that any information that is provided at
runtime cannot be known by the static analysis. A common example of this is a filename supplied
by the user during program execution. The algorithm may be able to determine if a “read” or
“write” permission is requested, but no way to identify the name of the file statically. This could
also be the case for an application that is designed to get information at runtime from other
applications and use this dynamic data to construct permission objects. This is a limitation of
static analysis in general, and a reason to explore other options to combine with static analysis to
produce a more complete picture of security requirements.
Chapter 3
Action-Centric Model
Even if it was possible to use static analysis to determine the required policy for an application,
the major access control related problems that face application developers and maintainers are not
solved. First, static analysis does not explain why permissions are needed. There could be logical
errors in the application that cause it to use resources that it should not. Second, the verbosity
of permission syntax is not addressed at all, since all calculations are done using permissions only.
Lastly, there is sill no notion of how the permissions interact with each other. This means that a
security hole could be disguised within a set of permissions. This sort of error is difficult to detect
even to an experienced policy writer. To address these concerns, we developed the Action-Centric
Model.
The Action-Centric Model for Java Security was developed to provide a higher level view of
Java Security. The Action-Centric Model focuses on the resources available to the developer and
what actions can be performed on those resources. Its purpose is to mask the complexities of
permission such as syntax concerns, syntax verbosity, unclear relationships between permissions,
and unfamiliar vocabulary of permissions. It attempts to present a more expressive and extensible
way to represent Java security policy than permissions.
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Design
To describe the Action-Centric Model, we show how it models a Java SocketPermission. A Sock-
etPermission, like many other Permissions, has two String fields that describe it. As described in
the JDK Documentation, the first is a “host specification,” and the second specifies the ways in
which the host will be accessed [12]. An example of a host and access specification:
• host = “sun.java.com:5000-6000”
• access = “accept”
So in Java syntax, we would have:
SocketPermission sunSocket = new SocketPermission("sun.java.com:5000-6000", "accept");
The host specification contains a host specified as an address, followed by a colon, followed
by a port range. The need to use this form of the syntax could be avoided if the host and the
port range parts of the parameter could be specified independently. In the Action-Centric Model,
the same SocketPermission is represented by an instance of the “Accept” Action Definition which
can be found in the “Socket Connections” Resource Definition. A Resource Definition defines a
15
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resource that is subject to access control and is used to group Action Definitions together. Action
Definitions define tasks that can be performed on a resource along with all the parameters that
are required to perform it. An instance of an Action Definition is called a Filled Action. In order
to create a useful Filled Action, all of the Action Definition’s parameters must be specified. When
the “Accept” filled action is translated, an instance of the “Socket Permission” Filled Rule, which
contains all the data needed to create the desired socket permission, will be the result. The Filled
Rule that is created by the translation can be viewed as if it were a permission object. The
usefulness of abstracting rules from permissions is detailed in 3.2.1, but for the purposes of most
of this document, it is acceptable to view filled rules and permissions as the same thing. In the
Action-Centric Model, the instance of the Filled Action with all parameters specified in would be





Figure 3.1: Example of filled socket accept action
The filled action shown in Figure 3.1 could be translated into an instance of a Rule Definition
that directly maps to the Permission shown in Figure 3.2.
• SocketPermissionRule
– host = “sun.java.com:5000-6000”
– access = “accept”
Figure 3.2: Example of SocketPermissionRule
In this case, it is fairly easy to see how the translation can happen - the two parameters in
the filled in action, address and portrange, are inserted into the correct locations to fill in a rule
that specifies a permission. The actual structure of the action definition, without any filled in






· access = “accept”
Figure 3.3: Example of socket accept action definition
In the general case, these parameters haven’t been filled in yet, so we see the locations in the
AppliedRule where they would be placed in the translation. host=“{address}:{portrange}” is a
mapping of the parameters of the action to the parameter that would be used to define a Permission.
The particular components that make up the model (shown as the mapping of “Resource-
ToRule” in Figure 3.4) are:
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• Resource Definition - Resource Definitions are named groups of Action Definitions. They
are simply used to describe where a particular Action Definition “belongs” (examples include
the “Socket Connections” resource, the “File System” resource, and the “Security System”
resource).
• Rule Definition - Rule Definitions are the representation of Java Permissions in the model.
Each Rule Definition in the model as defined corresponds to exactly one Permission class.
• Applied Rule - An Applied Rule describes how parameters of an Action Definition should
be translated into parameters of a particular Rule Definition.
• Action Definition - An Action Definition is a specification of how to translate a security
capability or behavior in the high level model to Permissions. It contains a set of parameters,
denoted as its Action Parameters, and a set of Applied Rules, which describe how these
parameters translate into the parameters of specific rules.
• Filled Rule - A Rule Definition with values for its parameters.
• Filled Action - An Action Definition with values for its parameters.
Figure 3.4: The relationship between resources, actions, and rules
Implementation of Resources Resources are represented by the ResourceDefinition class. The
ResourceModel keeps track of all the ResourceDefinitions that are available in the current model
and provides methods to search for specific ResourceDefinition instances.
Implementation of Actions Each ResourceDefinition contains a set of ActionDefinitions describ-
ing all possible actions that can be performed on the resource. Each ActionDefinition contains a
set of ParameterDefinitions describing all the input data required to create a FilledActionDefinition.
Each ParameterDefinition may supply a default value, or not. A FilledActionDefinition is instanti-
ated with an ActionDefinition as an argument to its constructor. The parameter value mapping
and examination functionalities are provided by FilledActionDefinition’s super class, FilledParam-
eterContainer. FilledParameterContainer provides the ability to map ParameterDefinitions to their
appropriate values. It also provides functionalities to help the parameter mapping process, such
as the ability to find unmapped parameters and the ability to resolve parameters to their defaults.
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Implementation of Rules All possible rules are represented by a set of RuleDefintions contained
in the singleton ResourceModel instance. Each RuleDefinition is labeled with a “rule type” attribute,
allowing rules describing multiple security systems to exist in the model concurrently while still
being easily distinguishable. RuleDefinitions contain a set of ParameterDefinitions defining all input
data required to create a FilledRuleDefinition. FilledRuleDefiniton extends FilledParameterContainer
to deal with parameter manipulations, just like FilledActionDefinition.
Conversion
An important feature of this model is the facility to translate from Permissions to Filled Actions
and vice versa. While the model uses the language of Rule Definitions and Filled Rules for Java
Permissions, the important result is the conversion to and from Filled Actions and Permissions. The
reasons for using the layer of abstraction provided by rules is discussed later. For this discussion, it
can be safely assumed that Rule Definitions have a one to one association with Permission classes,
and Filled Rules have a one to one association with instances of Permission objects.
Using a fairly straightforward algorithm, it is possible to translate a set of Filled Actions into
a set of Filled Rules. A more complex algorithm is used to translate a set of Filled Rules into a
set of Filled actions. In this section we describe the specifics of mapping the parameters of actions
to the parameters of rules, and the translation of Filled Actions to Filled Rules and back.
Parameter Mapping The mapping between actions and rules is done via the applied rule
construct, which describes how some number of action parameters can be converted into the rule
parameters for one particular action definition and rule definition. When filled actions or filled
rules are created, applied rules can be used to translate back and forth.
To meet these requirements, the mechanism for mapping from one set of parameters to the
other needed a few qualities:
1. Reversibility - The process used to convert from an action to a set of rules had to be able
to be reversed to convert from a set of rules to actions. Ideally, this would mean a 1-to-1
function from sets of action parameters to rule parameters.
2. Simplicity - A simple mechanism for defining these mappings would allow for easier specifi-
cation of rule and action definitions, and help with reversibility
3. Expressibility - The mapping needed to represent a number of ways of taking information
expressed in terms of actions and converting to the level of detail found in rules (similar to
the level of detail in permissions).
The method that was chosen was a fairly straightforward variable replacement. An applied
rule would specify, using special characters, the places in a string where to substitute the value of
an action parameter. To enforce reversibility, adjacent action parameters are not allowed in the
parameter mapping. Any number of action parameters can be used any number of times in the
parameter mapping. Formally, a parameter application takes the form:
({ρ}ω+)∗ + (ω+{ρ})∗ + {ρ}(ω+{ρ})∗ + ω+
Figure 3.5: Formal expression of parameter applications
With a few extra restrictions, where ρ is an action parameter and ω is any character other than
“{” or “}”. Note that “{” and “}” are the delimiters for where action parameters are substituted
(and are removed in the substitution), and () have the usual regular expression meaning in the form
shown above. The only remaining restriction is that if there is a string between two substitution
clauses, the action parameters cannot have that string as a substring. For example, given action
parameters A and B, the following are legal parameter applications:





But in the first case, if A or B contained a single “.” it would be impossible to reverse the
process given the substituted string. The same is true of B in the third case, and if A contained a
“/” in the second.
Action to Rules Conversion To convert FilledActions (that is, actions with specified parame-
ters), to FilledRules, the process is straightforward. ActionDefinitions have AppliedRules that specify
particular RuleDefinitions which they map to, and descriptions of how to insert the ActionParameters
into specific RuleParameters. The mapping the parameters in this direction is implemented with
a simple string substitution algorithm, here denoted as mapToRuleParameter(). The algorithm
for conversion follows is shown in Figure 3.6.
1: ActionToRules(A [A FilledAction])
2: P ← ActionParameters(A)
3: R← ∅
4: for all α ∈ AppliedRules(A) do
5: τ ← ∅
6: for all ρ ∈ ParameterApplications(α) do
7: τ ← τ ∪ {mapToRuleParameter(P, ρ)}
8: end for
9: R← R ∪ {createRule(RuleType(α), τ)}
10: end for
11: returnR
Figure 3.6: Creation of filled rules from filled actions
Rules to Actions Conversion The process of converting from a given set of FilledRules into
a set of FilledActions is slightly more complicated. Since a given Rule could be applied by many
Actions, it is necessary to go through all the AppliedRules for each Action Definition, find those
FilledRules of the same type as the Applied Rule, and perform reverse mapping of the Rule’s
parameters into potential Action parameters as specified by the Applied Rule. The first part of
the algorithm does the reverse variable mapping and builds sets of rules and their reverse variable
mappings that correspond to particular applied rules. This is shown in Figure 3.7. The second
phase of the algorithm takes these associations of applied rules, filled rules, and reverse parameter
mappings, and groups them into sets that fully represent filled actions. This is shown in Figure
3.8.
Further discussion of a few points of the algorithm:
• A mapping (that is, the name of a variable to a value), in this case is referring to ActionPa-
rameters which can be inferred from the RuleParameter of a FilledRule.
• Any one of these mappings can “conflict” with the parameters in a given FilledRule. In line
10, this check is to ensure that a given set of FilledRules that compose a FilledAction will
agree on the values of the parameters for the FilledAction, since a large initial set of rules
may be analyzed.
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1: RulesToActions(ActionDefs [A Set of ActionDefinitions], Rules [A Set of F illedRules])
2: pi ← ∅ {pi will be an association from AppliedRules to tuples of FilledRules and sets of param-
eter mappings}
3: RuleSets← ∅
4: for all A ∈ ActionDefs do
5: pi ← ∅
6: for all α ∈ AppliedRules(A) do
7: ρ← ∅
8: for all R ∈ Rules where R = RuleType(α) do
9: ρ← ρ ∪ {〈R, reverseMap(RuleParameters(R,α))〉}
10: end for
11: pi ← pi ∪ {〈α, ρ〉}
12: end for
13: RuleSets← RuleSets ∪GetSetsOfRulesForActions(pi, ∅)
14: end for
15: return CreateActionFromSpecificSet(RuleSets)
Figure 3.7: Converting rules to actions, step 1
• The return value ReturnSets will contain a set of sets of FilledRules, and each of these sets
will fully describe a single FilledAction. The function CreateActionFromSpecificSet takes
one of these sets and creates the particular FilledAction.
So, given a set of Permissions, these algorithms can be used to create a set of corresponding
Filled Actions defined by particular Action Definitions.
Special Cases Several interesting things happen when rules are converted. Consider two actions
A and B where action A requires rule 1 and action B requires rules 1 and 2. If action B is granted,
then translated into its component rules, then translated back to actions, we find that the resultant
set of actions is now A and B, even though only B was granted. We call B an implied action. While
this may seem like a logic problem at first, we can actually use this to our advantage. By implying
additional actions from the set of actions granted, a more complete understanding of the security
requirements is gained. For instance, imagine a more complex example using 3 to 5 actions implying
1 or 2 others.
Consider a case where an access control policy is already in existence and has been represented
in filled rules. For example, filled rules 1, 2, and 3 are granted. Action A is the only action defined,
and it requires rules 1 and 2. When the filled rules are translated to filled actions, only action A
will be represented. If the resultant action were to be converted back to rules, only filled rules 1
and 2 would exist; filled rule 3 would be lost! Filled rule 3 is referred to as an unmatched rule.
Because it is not acceptable to lose security requirements during translation, the Action-Centric
Model has a special container for unmatched rules such that they can exist and influence the
resultant security policy without being associated with a filled action. Unmatched rules can be
incorporated back into actions at a later time if either more filled rules are added such that an
action could be created using the unmatched rule or a filled action is added that requires the filled
rule represented by the unmatched rule.
3.1.2 XML Specification of Definitions
For this project, the structure for defining resources, actions, and rules is given in an XML schema.
An XML document following this schema can define an explicit set of resources, actions, and rules
that represents security capabilities and references an implementation in the form of rules. In the
case of this project, all of the rules described Java Permissions. It would be a just as straightforward
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to make rules for any other security system that would like to describe actions in terms of low-level
items or statements in the implementation.
The XML structure was decided upon for a few reasons:
• The containment structures of XML schema are appropriate for the structure of resources,
actions, and rules.
• The process of creating and editing XML is well known, which supports extensibility of the
definitions.
• There are tools, such as JAXB, used in this project, that enable flexible XML modifications
to facilitate conversion from XML to Java objects and back again.
The structure of the model in terms of XML mirrors the form shown earlier in Figure 3.4. The
root element, ResourceToRule, is an aggregation of a set of ResourceDefinitions and RuleDefinitions.
ResourceDefinitions contain a set of ActionDefinitions. These ActionDefinitions contain a set of
ActionParameters, and a set of AppliedRules containing ParameterApplications. These constructs
specify just how the parameters specified in an action will be mapped to rules. The arrows between
AppliedRule and RuleDefinition, and between ParameterApplication and RuleParameter, represent the
relationship between actions and rules is found in the model. In XML these are only specified by
giving the name of the referenced RuleDefinition or RuleParameter within a RuleDefinition.
One additional feature provided in the XML description of definitions is the ability to specify
parameters to “group” actions by. It is possible to put a “group by” annotation on an action
parameter, which is used in the tool to group filled actions of that type by the parameter specified.
This is particularly useful in the case of things like FilePermissions or SocketPermissions, where
several actions may reference to the same file or socket parameter.
As an example, the Socket Accept action shown in the initial example is shown in its XML
specification in Figure 3.9.
3.1.3 NetBeans Plug-In
To apply the model to the development process, it was necessary to design a method by which
instances of the model could be created and manipulated. The end goal would be to provide an
interface to create and edit both the definitions of actions and rules, and filled instances of actions
and rules. The filled instances could be turned into policy files based on the specification of the
rules, and the definitions could be saved as definition files.
While all of these goals were not accomplished, some of these features were implemented as a
NetBeans plug-in. It provides a toolbox for a user to load a definition file, create actions and rules,
and see how the mappings between the two work. See Appendix B for a guide to using the tool.
In particular, the tool as implemented allows a user to:
• Load a definition file and view the resources, actions, and rules defined.
• Create filled instances of actions and rules, and see the relationship between them.
• See a diff-type view that compares two policies in terms of actions and rules side-by-side.
• Save and load configurations into the tool
In Section 3.2, several desirable extensions to the tool are discussed.
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3.2 Results
3.2.1 Successes
The Action-Centric Model provides a new way to view Java access control policy. By providing
a higher-level view of Java access control, the Action-Centric Model allows application developers
and maintainers to produce and analyze complex policies in a familiar vocabulary that is both
simpler and more intuitive than Java permissions. The model allows for any set of action and
rule definitions to be used. This makes the model very flexible in the sense that any user has the
ability to redefine the entire structure of possible actions and rules. The abstraction of rules away
from permissions makes the model independent of the underlying access control system, making it
possible to support other access control models in the future.
Creating Definitions
To get a large set of definitions to test the functionality of the model implementation, the vast
majority of the standard named Permissions in the JDK were defined using resources, actions, and
rules in the Action-Centric Model. This included creating actions that referred to specific sets of
named Permissions, and parameterized actions that could refer to Permissions with more complex
parameters (similar to the socket example in section 3.1.1). These definitions provide an example
of how the model can be used to group together Permissions which either have similar meanings or
combine to mean something more.
In general, the definitions we created provided parameterized actions in obvious cases (files,
sockets, and other permissions without a specified, finite set of possible choices). In other cases, we
grouped named Permissions together into actions when they were obviously related to a common
resource or task. We expect that security developers with more domain specific knowledge could
define definitions which would be more useful in certain environments. Some examples are shown
in Appendix C.
The ability to create definitions in the form of this model helps in two particular ways.
1. Convenience - To take an example, an applet developer may not know or care to know that
three AWTPermissions, constructed with target fields “createRobot,” “accessEventQueue,”
and “listenToAllAWTEvents” are required to create and manipulate certain on-screen events.
If this developer is presented with a tool that shows the “Applet and Media Output” resource
with the “Control AWT Events” action, it may be easier to simply select this option. This
provides an acceptable approximation of the security requirements of the program, rather
than having the developer learn each of these requirements. In this way, the model and tool
aim to provide a simpler mechanism for uninitiated security users to specify program policy.
2. Interpretation of existing policy - An existing set of Permissions can be interpreted in
terms of defined actions and rules. That is, as long as there is a rule defined that refers
to a particular Permission, along with a set of actions grouped by resources relevant to the
security context, the low-level information from the security information can be interpreted
at a high level. Information about Permissions could come from existing policy or the results
of a static analysis. This is useful in interpreting the permissions that express access to low-
level security resources like properties, library loading, sockets, and the file system. Grouping
these things by the parameters of the actions can show relationships that exist between them.
For example, it could be that the ability to load a specific library and read a specific directory,
in combination, is particularly interesting. The model allows for an interpretation of these
cases from implementation level security information (Permissions), and also the top-down
specification of such policy.
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NetBeans Plug-in
A plug-in for NetBeans was created to exhibit some of the useful features of the model. More than
that, it really is representative of one environment in which the model could be well used. Partic-
ularly in the case of web applications, a security policy is almost always part of the development
process, and this tool is the start of a way to easily define this kind of policy at development time.
In the ideal version of the tool, a user would specify actions that described what they were trying
to do with their application, and the tool would take care of converting this into Permissions for
their application to use.
In addition to the simpler interface to Permissions it offers, the tool provides functionality for
advanced security users. A user can choose to specify an instance of the model in terms of specific
rules, along with actions. This is similar to using Policy Tool[1] to create specific Permissions. The
tool reports what actions are composed from the various rules in the current policy configuration.
In addition, multiple policies defined by either method can be compared to one another using
the policy configuration diff view. This allows two policies, in terms of actions and rules, to be
compared side by side. This could be used to compare potential new policies to old ones, or simply
see how changing certain actions and rules alters the policy. Defining the policy in terms of rules
and using the diff view to compare configurations would be methods used by someone knowledgable
in the security domain using a definition model to better understand policy decisions.
Extensibility
One of the primary desirable attributes of the Action-Centric Model is its extensibility. The
definitions file can be edited to include new kinds of resources, actions, and rules, that refer to
one another or existing ones. This flexibility allows for different interpretations of the meaning
of actions to be expressed without any changes to the underlying Action-Centric Model. Certain
systems may define their own Permissions. The definitions file allows actions to be added to existing
or new resources that map to new rules representing these domain-specific Permissions.
The implementation of the model in XML definitions is one feature that allows for this exten-
sibility. The model is quite portable - one could imagine bundling a definitions file and an instance
of a policy configuration with some code to specify the policy in this format.
Independence from Security Implementation
It is theoretically possible to export to or import from almost any sort of policy. The policy
converters developed by this project were designed specifically for Java Permissions, however, the
model was designed with a much broader view. These other policies can be supported simply by
developing some simple converter classes and adding rule conversion definitions.
Once new policy types are supported, the Action-Centric Model could act as a sort of universal
security description language, by which policies written in any supported form could be described
in the context of actions and exported to any supported policy type.
3.2.2 Limitations
The current design and implementation of the Action-Centric Model leaves some things to be
desired. Extensions are discussed in detail in 4.3.1, but a few of the prominent limitations are
noted in particular here.
Parameters in Lists
Each action parameter is always specified as a discrete named field. There are some permissions
in Java that have more advanced parameter syntax than the Action-Centric Model can describe
using this approach. It would be desirable to, in some cases, allow a certain action parameter to
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act like a collection. For instance, DelegationPermissions have one string argument which contains
a list of paired things (in this case “Principals” and “Subjects”). This permission is intended to
allow certain capabilities between these pairs of things in this list. In the current definition of
actions, there is no way to have an arbitrarily sized list as a parameter. This means there is no
way to define an action to rule translation for DelegationPermission that would allow a series of
principal and subject pairs to be defined. For this reason, the action defined in our definitions is
forced to expose the permission syntax to the action parameter. A single parameter must be filled
with the textual representation of the list of principal and subject pairs.
Self-Reference of Actions
Currently in the model, resources contain actions and actions contain parameters and applied
rules, which reference specific rule definitions. There is no case where a resource could contain a
sub-resource, or an action could contain a sub-action. This limits the definitions to rigid categories.
More expressiveness could be gained by allowing some type of recursive nesting, especially within
actions. This would make definitions more reusable, and make extensions to the model easier to
manage.
Testing and Use of Definitions and Tool
The tool as implemented is primarily a proof of concept of the model design. It shows the rele-
vant features of the model using definitions of resources, actions, and rules that were created from
common Java Permissions. For further improvements to the model and the tool, as well as an un-
derstanding of what kinds of definitions are most effective, using the tool in the actual development
of several applications would be desired. It would be valuable to see which types of definitions are
deemed the most intuitive and provide the most flexibility, and how much the model is judged to
actually help inexperienced (and experienced) security users define policy. Further feedback from
developers used to the Java security environment would also help to create new definitions and
understand how the tool and model could be improved.
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1: GetSetsOfRulesForActions(pi [A set of tuples as described above], RuleSetAcc [An
accumulator])
2: if pi = ∅ then
3: return ∅
4: end if
5: ρ←  ∈ pi
6: pi ← pi \ {}
7: ReturnSets← ∅
8: for all 〈Rule,Mappings〉 ∈ ρ do
9: {Recall that ρ contains tuples of rules and sets of reverse parameter mappings}
10: if Any mapping from RuleSetAcc conflicts with Rule then
11: return null
12: end if
13: RuleSetAcc← RuleSetAcc ∪ {〈Rule,Mappings〉}
14: RestOfSets← GetSetsOfRulesForActions(pi,RuleSetAcc)
15: if RestOfSets = null then
16: return null
17: end if
18: if RestOfSets = ∅ then
19: ReturnSets← ReturnSets ∪ {{〈Rule,Mappings〉}}
20: else
21: for all RuleSet ∈ ReturnSets do
22: RuleSet← RuleSet ∪ {〈Rule,Mappings〉}





Figure 3.8: Converting rules to actions, step 2
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<ac t i on name=”Accept”>
<d e s c r i p t i o n>
Represents the ac t i on o f accept ing a socke t connect ion .
</ d e s c r i p t i o n>
<act ionParameters>
<act ionParameter name=” address ” />
<act ionParameter name=” portrange ” />
</ act ionParameters>
<app l i edRule s>
<appl iedRule type=” Permiss ion ”
name=” SocketPermiss ion ”>
<parameterAppl i cat ions>
<parameterAppl icat ion name=” host ”
value=”{hostname} : { portrange }” />
<parameterAppl icat ion name=” a c c e s s ”
value=” accept ” />
</ parameterAppl i cat ions>
</ appl i edRule>
</ app l i edRule s>
</ ac t i on>
Figure 3.9: XML Specification of Socket Accept
Chapter 4
Evaluation and Future Work
4.1 Permission Identification
As this project progressed, it became apparent that static analysis would be unable to solve the
problems at hand. Because of the undecidable nature of the problem, it will never be possible
to accurately determine all permission requirements statically, nor will it be possible to precisely
determine the all parameters required to instantiate Permission objects. Because the algorithm used
by this project favored overestimation, the output is overwhelming. The compute time needed to
run the analysis is also fairly high, which would discourage its use. Even if all these issues were
solved, the data is only useful to make the analyzed application run. No data is provided about
why permissions are required or how they interact with each other to produce an access control
policy.
4.2 Action-Centric Model
The Action-Centric Model combines several important features to deliver a new perspective to Java
access control. The high-level view of access control provided by the Action-Centric Model allows
application developers and maintainers to develop policy in a vocabulary that is more familiar
than permissions. A policy created using the Action-Centric Model can still be used by Java’s
current access control system by simply translating the filled actions into a set of permissions.
Assuming the action definitions, rule definitions, and translation templates are defined correctly,
the policy that results from the permissions will be identical to the one modeled using filled
actions. This assumption highlights one of the key topics for extension. The definition file defines
all resources, action definitions, rule definitions, and translations between filled actions and filled
rules. By changing the definition file, new sets of action definitions can be introduced providing new
ways to implement policy. Translations can be changed to make filled actions represent different
sets of filled rules, which will represent different sets of permissions. The use of rules instead
of regular permissions gives the model the ability to be independent of the underlying security
implementation. Because of this abstraction, it is theoretically possible for the Action-Centric
Model to support almost any access control system, though this project focused solely on Java’s
Permission-based system.
4.2.1 Soundness of Model Translation
A few features of the translation functions in the Action-Centric Model are worth mentioning.
First, if a given set of filled rules is translated into filled actions and back again, the exact same
set of filled rules will result. If a given set of filled actions is translated into filled rules, there may
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be more filled actions produced by the translation back to filled actions, as mentioned in 3.1.1.
Repeated translations will be stable from this point forward. More formally, given the translation
function α from filled actions to filled rules, and the translation function β from filled rules to filled
actions:
• β : α = idrules
• α : β : α : β = α : idrules : β = α : β
4.3 Future Work
Extensions to this project can be divided into two main categories: extensions to the Action-
Centric Model, and extensions to the NetBeans plug-in. A few possible extensions of each type
are presented here.
4.3.1 Action-Centric Model Extensions
Parameterized Resources
The main reason the Action-Centric Model is called “Action Centric” and not “Resource Centric”
is because there are no meaningful parameters on the Resource class, and the notion of an “instance
of a unique resource” is not modeled. Creating instances of unique resources with attached actions
may allow more flexibility in the model. For instance, with unique resources, it would be easier to
find all actions associated with a unique resource.
For example, to model a file resource with a read and a write action under the current version
of the model requires two actions be created, one for read and one for write. The file parameter
is the same on both actions. To model the same authorization under a Resource Centric model,
one resource would be created using the appropriate file path, then the read and write actions
would be associated with that unique resource. The benefit in the resource centric view is that
unique resources are identified instead of having many actions that are not directly related. There
is a small workaround built into the model that allows action definitions to specify a grouping
parameter. For example, file actions are grouped by file path. In this way, the plug-in’s user
interface knows to group all files with the same path under one node. This makes the file resource
more apparent to the user without changing the focus of the model to resources.
Actions Containing Actions
There is currently no support in the model to have actions defined as a group of other actions.
Only rules may be used when defining an action’s contents. If actions could be composed of
other actions, the action definitions would be much simpler to maintain, and provide much more
information about applications’ security requirements.
4.3.2 NetBeans Plug-In Extensions
Integration with Static Analysis
Due to time constraints, this project was not able to integrate static analysis results into the
plug-in’s user interface. In order to use the results within NetBeans, the following steps would be
taken:
1. Run static analysis on project code within NetBeans. This is actually harder than it sounds.
There is a significant amount of class-path configuration that needs to be handed to Soot
before the static analysis will run properly.
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2. Use the Action-Centric Model to translate static analysis results (a collection of Permission-
Descriptions) into a CodeGroup object. This step is trivial; all the code to do it is in place
and working in the import functionality.
3. Add the CodeGroup to the plug-in’s repository so that it can be seen in all the standard
views.
Use During Application Deployment
Ideally, the plug-in should be extended to generate a working policy file and inject it into the
deliverable when the application is being packaged. Currently, the policy file that is generated is
not a standard Java policy file, though it would not take significant effort to make it. There is no
facility to package files generated by the plug-in into the application deliverable.
Storage of Policies
In order to further simplify the process of developing policy, it may be helpful to store a set of
standard policies, which could be packaged with the plug-in or could be created by the user. These
policies could then be quickly attached to NetBeans projects. This approach would make the task
of maintaining several projects that share a common policy much simpler and encourage reuse of
previously written policies.
User Interface Improvements
The user interface for the NetBeans plug-in was still under heavy development at the conclusion
of the project. Many refinements are outstanding, including:
• Friendly parameter input. For example, when defining a new action on a file, the “file name”
field should not be a text field; it should be a file chooser or some other form of easy entry.
• Difference highlighting in comparison view
• Ability to hide the rules pane
Create a Definition Editor
An intuitive definition editor could provide a powerful mechanism for developers to specify different
kinds of policy for particular domains. Currently, any changes to the definitions of resources,
actions, and rules must be done manually in XML. This is tedious, and discourages use of the
model.
Appendix A - Static Analysis
Example
This appendix describes a sample run of the static analysis procedure.
The test classes under analysis are shown here:
public class CallGraphs {
//Entry point
public static void main(String[] args) {
test();
}
public static void test() {





public void foo() {
FilePermission fp = new FilePermission("/File1", "read");
SecurityManager sm = System.getSecurityManager();





public void bar() {
anotherPermission();
File f = new File("/File2");
f.exists();
}
public void anotherPermission() {
RuntimePermission rp = new RuntimePermission("ARuntimePermission", null);
SecurityManager sm = System.getSecurityManager();
if (sm != null) {
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sm.checkPermission(rp);
}
MyThread mt = new MyThread();
threadPasser1(mt);
}
public void threadPasser1(MyThread mt) {
threadPasser2(mt);
}




class MyThread extends Thread {
public void run() {
FilePermission f = new FilePermission("/File3", "read,write");
SecurityManager sm = System.getSecurityManager();





A lot of results are produced, mostly because of the unaddressed virtual call problem in library
code causing many permissions to be found at that level. A sample of some output:






































So the analysis returns far more permissions than are actually required and explicitly checked
by the classes listed. In particular, our analysis was only interested in 4 out of 35 of the Permissions
that were listed. The exact cause of this in the call graph seems to come from the combined effects
of calls through the static initializer methods of classes like Object, System, and SecurityManager.
Further analysis of exactly where all the permissions come from would be the best way to improve
the accuracy of this analysis.





So the analysis reported that main() requires all of the permissions created in the test classes.
For these permissions, the following permissions result for each method (an X denotes that the
permission as numbered above is required):
Method 1 2 3 4
main() X X X X
test() X X X X
foo() X X X X
bar() - X X X
anotherPermission() - - X X
threadPasser1() - - - -
threadPasser2() - - - -
run() - - X -
There are a few important things to notice here.
1. Permissions propagate upward as expected, from bar() to foo() to test(), etc. This shows
that permissions found at certain levels are in fact added to the methods “above” them in
the call graph as the traversal works its way backward.
2. The FilePermission with the unknown (???) first argument, but known “read” parameter, is
comes from within the File.exists() method. File.exists() calls SecurityManager.checkRead(),
which looks like this:
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This illustrates the parameter problem with the data flow analysis, since File.exists() ex-
tracts the name of the file and passes it to checkRead. The analysis does go and find the
actual String constant represented by the constant and report it, however. A more in depth
interprocedural data flow analysis would likely be able to determine the value of this string
in the case shown here.
3. The two threadPasser methods do not report those found required by MyThread.run(). This
is because of how Threads work in a security context. The context that created the Thread
object (anotherPermission()) is the context above that of MyThread.run() as far as the
AccessController is concerned.
Appendix B - NetBeans Plug-In
Guide
This section provides an introduction to the NetBeans Plug-In developed to showcase the Action-
Centric Model. Installation instructions can be found in the tool distribution archives.
The plug-in is started by selecting “Security Analysis Tool” from NetBeans’ Tools menu. After
that, the user is presented with screen shown in Figure 4.1. A definition file should be selected
that conforms to the XML standards outlined in 3.1.2. A “policy configuration” is a set of actions
and rules that are grouped together into a unified policy. An existing policy configuration can be
loaded, or a new one can be created. The name of the policy configuration can also be specified.
Once the starting dialog is accepted, the user is presented with the main pane, seen in Figure 4.2.
This screen presents all the major functionalities of the plug-in, including: adding and removing
rules and actions, importing and exporting policies, and comparing policies.
To add an action, first expand the appropriate resource. Then select the appropriate action
and fill in all the parameters. An example is shown in Figure 4.3.
Once the action is added, the main screen is updated as shown in 4.4. Notice that the action has
been added, and also all the rules that would be needed to create the action in Java permissions.
Adding rules works similarly to this process.
If actions are added that can be grouped by parameters (as described in 3.2.1 and 3.1.2) they
are grouped properly under the appropriate resource type, as shown in Figure 4.5.
Using the “Diff” button on the main screen, we can compare two policies, as demonstrated in
Figure 4.6. Using the “Add” buttons, actions and rules can be copied between policies.
The plug-in also demonstrates how unmatched rules (see 3.1.1) work. Take this example - in
Figure 4.7, we see a single action with all the appropriate rules to support it. By removing one
of the rules, we expect no actions, and 2 unmatched rules. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.8.
Notice the unmatched rules are highlighted in red.
The import and export buttons work as expected, as demonstrated in Figures 4.9 and 4.10,
respectively. At the time of this writing, the policies are imported and exported from a simple
text file that is not directly readable by any other application.
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Figure 4.1: Plug-In startup screen
Figure 4.2: Plug-In main screen
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Figure 4.3: Adding a simple action
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Figure 4.4: Plug-In main screen with actions and rules
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Figure 4.5: Grouping demonstration
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Figure 4.6: Diff view
CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION AND FUTURE WORK 40
Figure 4.7: Unmatched rules demonstration - all matched
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Figure 4.8: Unmatched rules demonstration - some unmatched
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Figure 4.9: Policy Import
Figure 4.10: Policy Export
Appendix C - XML Specification
of File System Actions
Here we show how the File System resource is defined in the Action-Centric Model.
A few things to note:
• The “groupBy” tag allows these actions to be grouped by that path (so all File Read, Write,
etc. actions could be shown that share the path field).
• There are no parameters specified for the Resource itself. Parameterizing an instance of File
System with a path would allow the actions to be specified without the path field if they
inherited it from the Resource.
• The “Read File and Load Library” action, which was created mostly for testing. It allowed
us to test a fairly simple case of needing to translate back into multiple action parameters
<r e s ou r c e name=” F i l e System”>
<ac t i on name=”Read”>
<act ionParameters>
<act ionParameter name=”path” groupBy=” true ”>
<d e s c r i p t i o n>
The path to the d e s i r e d f i l e or d i r e c t o r y .
</ d e s c r i p t i o n>
</ act ionParameter>
</ act ionParameters>
<app l i edRule s>
<appl iedRule type=” Permiss ion ” name=” Fi l ePe rmi s s i on ”>
<parameterAppl i cat ions>
<parameterAppl icat ion name=”path”
value=”{path}” />
<parameterAppl icat ion name=” ac t i on ”
value=” read ” />
</ parameterAppl i cat ions>
</ appl i edRule>
</ app l i edRule s>
</ ac t i on>
<ac t i on name=”Read and Load Library ”>
<act ionParameters>
<act ionParameter name=”path” groupBy=” true ”>
<d e s c r i p t i o n>
The path to the d e s i r e d f i l e or d i r e c t o r y .
</ d e s c r i p t i o n>
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</ act ionParameter>
<act ionParameter name=” libraryName ”>
</ act ionParameter>
</ act ionParameters>
<app l i edRule s>
<appl iedRule type=” Permiss ion ” name=” Fi l ePe rmi s s i on ”>
<parameterAppl i cat ions>
<parameterAppl icat ion name=”path”
value=”{path}” />
<parameterAppl icat ion name=” ac t i on ”
value=” read ” />
</ parameterAppl i cat ions>
</ appl i edRule>
<appl iedRule type=” Permiss ion ” name=” RuntimePermission ”>
<parameterAppl i cat ions>
<parameterAppl icat ion name=”name”
value=” loadLibrary .{ l ibraryName}” />
</ parameterAppl i cat ions>
</ appl i edRule>
</ app l i edRule s>
</ ac t i on>
<ac t i on name=”Write”>
<act ionParameters>
<act ionParameter name=”path” groupBy=” true ”>
<d e s c r i p t i o n>
The path to the d e s i r e d f i l e or d i r e c t o r y .
</ d e s c r i p t i o n>
</ act ionParameter>
</ act ionParameters>
<app l i edRule s>
<appl iedRule type=” Permiss ion ” name=” Fi l ePe rmi s s i on ”>
<parameterAppl i cat ions>
<parameterAppl icat ion name=”path”
value=”{path}” />
<parameterAppl icat ion name=” ac t i on ”
value=” wr i t e ” />
</ parameterAppl i cat ions>
</ appl i edRule>
</ app l i edRule s>
</ ac t i on>
<ac t i on name=” Execute ”>
<act ionParameters>
<act ionParameter name=”path” groupBy=” true ”>
<d e s c r i p t i o n>
The path to the d e s i r e d f i l e or d i r e c t o r y .
</ d e s c r i p t i o n>
</ act ionParameter>
</ act ionParameters>
<app l i edRule s>
<appl iedRule type=” Permiss ion ” name=” Fi l ePe rmi s s i on ”>
<parameterAppl i cat ions>
<parameterAppl icat ion name=”path”
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value=”{path}” />
<parameterAppl icat ion name=” ac t i on ”
value=” execute ” />
</ parameterAppl i cat ions>
</ appl i edRule>
</ app l i edRule s>
</ ac t i on>
<ac t i on name=” Delete ”>
<act ionParameters>
<act ionParameter name=”path” groupBy=” true ”>
<d e s c r i p t i o n>
The path to the d e s i r e d f i l e or d i r e c t o r y .
</ d e s c r i p t i o n>
</ act ionParameter>
</ act ionParameters>
<app l i edRule s>
<appl iedRule type=” Permiss ion ” name=” Fi l ePe rmi s s i on ”>
<parameterAppl i cat ions>
<parameterAppl icat ion name=”path”
value=”{path}” />
<parameterAppl icat ion name=” ac t i on ”
value=” d e l e t e ” />
</ parameterAppl i cat ions>
</ appl i edRule>
</ app l i edRule s>
</ ac t i on>
</ r e sou r c e>
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